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THE EMPLOYEE/INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR DICHOTOMY: A ROSE IS
NOT ALWAYS A ROSE
John Bruntz*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Defining the nature of a working relationship between suppliers
of services and the parties to whom these services are rendered is one
of the most troublesome and important issues facing businesses toemployday. The determination of whether workers are considered
1 for the parties
implications
ees or independent contractors has grave
involved, and the issue highlights some fundamental realities facing
the post-industrial United States.
As the Internal Revenue Service moves more aggressively to enforce compliance, 2 and as changes in the makeup of the work force
emerge,3 the characterization of workers as employees or indepeninvolves workdent contractors grows increasingly critical. The issue
4 to physicians,5
laborers
farm
from
society,
ers at every strata of
7
from newspaper delivery persons 6 to attorneys, and from actors and
musicians 8 to engineers.9 Farms and small businesses are impacted
acutely because they face potentially fatal retroactive tax reclassification 0 and unfair labor charges" if nominal independent contrac* President and Chief Operating Officer of the Wittern Group, Inc. Special thanks to
Colleen Casady and Paul Kittredge, Jr. in their help of this Article.

1. See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.

STAFF OF THE JoINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, General Explanation of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, at 1343-44 [hereinafter JOINT COMraMTTEE]. See also infra note 63 and
2.

accompanying text.

3. See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 285-314 and accompanying text.
5.

See infra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.

6. See infra notes 104-12 and accompanying text.
7. See Perritt, Should Some Independent ContractorsBe Redefined As "Employees"
Under Labor Law?, 33 ViLL. L. REv. 989, 993 n.19 (1989) (suggesting that all lawyers who
do not have their own library are employees of a particular client).
8. Id. at 1029-32.
9. See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
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tors are found to be employees. Commercial realities, however, provide equally compelling reasons for continuing to treat workers as
independent contractors."2 Little guidance is available for an absolute determination because the various common law1 3 and statutory
distinctions 4 are widely divergent and subject to broad ranges of
interpretation.' 5
The purpose of this discussion will be to highlight the various
analyses used to determine whether a worker is an employee or an
independent contractor'

6

and to focus on the tax consequences,

7

the

implications on labor and employment issues' 8 and on state workers
compensation legislation"9 of such a determination. Three diverse occupational fields will be illustratively employed to apply the abstract
factors to work place realities. 20 Finally, the discussion will focus on
threads of commonality used in making the determination and suggest means of minimizing exposure and avenues to proceed with a
reasonable level of certainty.2
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The distinction between an employee and an independent contractor has evolved from the common law concept of master and servant 22 and the law of agency. 23 It was, however, in determining the
scope of vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior
that the degree of the master's control over his servant became the
11. See NLRB v. H. & H. Pretzel, 831 F.2d 650 (6th Cir. 1987).
12. See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
13. The leading case defining "employee" for employment tax purposes is United States
v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947). See also NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944);
Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947).
14. Compare 29 U.S.C. §152(3) (1982) (defining employee for purposes of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA)) with 29 U.S.C. §630(0 (1982) (defining employee for purposes of age discrimination in employment) and 29 U.S.C. §652(6) (1982) (defining employee
for purposes of the Occupational Safety and Health Act).
15. On virtually identical facts the courts in United States Dept of Labor v. Lauritzen,
835 F.2d 1529 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 988 U.S. 898 (1988), and Donovan v. Brandel,
736 F.2d 1114 (6th Cir. 1984) reached diametrically opposite results.
16. See infra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 40-93 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 94-215 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 216-48 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 249-332 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 333-42 and accompanying text.
22. See Stevens, The Test of the Employment Relation, 38 MICH. L. REV. 188, 189-97,
(1939).
23. REsTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF AGENCY 220 (1933) is often referred to as the source of
the common law on the independent contractor versus employee issue. The RESTATEMENT Uses
the term "master" for employer and "servant" for employee. Id. at (2).
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paramount consideration. 24 If the master controlled the economic activity of another person, the other person was a servant.
The right-to-control test was first developed in the mid-nineteenth century by English courts and was soon adopted by American
courts. 25 American courts embraced Blackstone's control rationale of
respondeat superior 26 as the logical test of the master-servant rela27
tionship. The seminal case was Boswell v. Laird, decided by the
California Supreme Court in 1857. In this case a dam under construction by a contractor burst, damaging the plaintiff's property,
and suit was brought against the landowner who was having the dam
built.2 8 Justice Field engaged in an extensive analysis of English law
in his opinion and ultimately determined:
"Something more than the mere selection, on the part of the
principal, is essential to [the relation of master and servant]. That
right must be accompanied with the power of subsequent control, in
the execution of the work contracted for. In the present case, that
power was wanting,29and of course, the relation to which it was essential did not exist."
The common law definition of independent contractor developed
with the control test being the threshhold inquiry. This definition
was outlined by the Restatement of Agency as, "[A] person who
undertakes to execute certain work or to accomplish a stipulated result for another, under such circumstances that the right of control
of the doing of the work, and of the faces and agencies employed in
0
doing it, is the contractor." 3 The evolution of the distinction between master/employer and servant/employee and independent contractor parallels the changes in economic activity as industrial development and production became more sophisticated.
Prior to the Industrial Revolution, work was performed largely
by entrepreneurial craftsmen and a relatively small number of servants. 3 l The forces that compelled turning independent contractors
24. Stevens, supra note 22, at 198.
25. See English Court - Sadler v. Henlock, 4 El. & B1. 570, 119 Eng. Rep. 209 (1855);
American Court - Boswell v. Laird, 8 Cal. 469 (1857).
26. "A master is, lastley, chargeable, if any of his family layeth or costeth anything out
of his house into the street or common highway, to the damage of any individual, or the
common nuisance. . . for the master hath the superintendance and charge of all his household." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 43 (1765).
27. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
28. Boswell, 8 Cal. at 489.
29. Id.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF AGENCY 220 (1933).
31 See generally A. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESs (1977).
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into employees were based in the Industrial Revolution and the development of mass manufacturing.3 2 Production efficiency was created by replacing decentralized "home" output with an integrated
system where each production stage was located as close as possible
to the preceding stage.3 3 The integrated enterprise demanded a large
number of employees and the larger enterprise needed a high degree
of control and predictability which they could get with employees
but which was not possible in commercial relationships with individual entrepreneurs. This approach fragmented the type of task performed by the individual and made it more difficult for a servant to
leave a particular master and find alternate employment, while at
the same time it created situations where work was defined in ways
that made employees fungible and easily replaceable. The integrated
system further increased the master's control, and consequently
made the distinction between employee and independent contractor
easy to draw. 4
It appears the previous benefits of greater control over the activities of the employees has diminished, either because of changes in
technology or because of changes in managerial philosophy. Today
patterns of economic activity are moving away from integration and
toward reducing managerial overhead and bureaucratic inflexibility.35 Decentralization redistributes work from groups of employees
to persons not subject to the same level of control. 31 In addition demographic factors put pressure on employers to organize work to accommodate the needs of parents and the elderly who will not be in
the labor force unless they can have flexible schedules and flexible
places to work. Changes that have taken place in the United States
over the past four decades have dramatically transformed the composition of the American work force and have irrevocably changed
its economy.38 The post World War II economic prosperity, fueled
by a strong manufacturing base and structured around a male
worker and an at-home spouse, is not part of today's economic or
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See generally J. BENIGER, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: TECHNOLOGICAL AND EcoNOMIC ORIGINS OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1986).
35. See id; see also Riddle, Service-Led Growth: The Role of the Service Sector in
World Development, 82 A.J.I.L. 224 (1988) (reviewing a variety of sources which discuss the
growth of service economics).
36. See Riddle, supra note 35, at 224.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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social reality. 9
The shift away from manufacturing and towards a service-based
economy, which began in the early to mid-1970's, is expected to continue as manufacturing jobs decline and jobs in the service sector
grow.4 0 In 1955, manufacturing produced 30% of all goods and services, but by 1985, the percentage dropped to 21 %.41 By the year
2000, manufacturing is expected to account for only 17% of all
goods and services produced. 2 Between 1979 and 1985, the United
States economy generated nearly eight million new jobs, but actually
3
lost more than 1.7 million jobs in manufacturing.
Employers are turning away from full-time employees because
of an inability to adapt their schedules to consumer patterns." Thus,
contracted services and part-time workers are becoming an increasingly predominant part of the working relationship. The line between
characterizing these workers as employees or independent contractors has grown less distinct. The tests which evolved from the Industrial Revolution must be evaluated in light of post-Industrial
realities.
III.

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

The term "employee" is used in many federal statutes, but its

legal meaning changes depending upon its context. Consequently, a

person classified as an "employee" under one statute may not qualify

as an "employee" under another.

5

The United States Supreme

Court has also provided guidance in the interpretation of the mean-

46
ing of employee under various federal statutes, but other than proffering general tests 47 the issue is far from settled.
The compounding difficulty is that the legislative intent of the
statutes has sent courts in diametrically opposite directions. The history of the Fair Labor Standards Act indicates that Congress in39. Id.
Id.
Id.
42. W. JOHNSTON, & A. PACKER, WORK FORCE 2000, WORK AND WORKERS FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AT XIX (1987).
43. G. BERLIN & A. SUM, TOWARD A MORE PERFECT UNION: BASIC SKILLS, POOR FAMILIES AND OUR EcONOMIC FUTURE 12 (1988).
44. Id.
45. EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32, 35-36 (3d Cir. 1983).
46. See, e.g., Kelley v. Southern Pac. Co., 419 U.S. 318, 321-26 (1974); NLRB v.
United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254 (1968); Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947);
Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. at 726-30 (1947); United States v. Silk, 331
40.
41.

U.S. at 713-15 (1947).
47. See infra notes 107-12, and 139-41 and accompanying text.
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tended the term "employee" in that Act to be given a particularly
broad interpretation.48 This same broad construction is also evident
in other social welfare legislation which is remedial in nature.49 On
the other hand, the legislative history of Section 530 of the Revenue
Act of 1978 specifies that there is broad latitude to consider an individual an independent contractor for employment tax purposes.50
A.

Tax Analysis

The term "employee" is not given a comprehensive definition in
the Internal Revenue Code. A different definition is used for income
tax withholding, 5 Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA) tax
purposes,52 and for Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) purposes. 53 Specific code and regulatory provisions apply to certain occupations,54 but most workers are classified on the basis of common
law. The common law test determines whether a worker is an employee if the employer has the right to direct and control when,
where and how the worker performs his tasks. 55 The employer need
not exercise control; it is sufficient if the employer has the right to do
so.56 The IRS has developed twenty common law factors to determine whether sufficient control exists to establish an employer-employee relationship. 57
From a tax perspective, a piecemeal statutory approach to defining an employee has developed to respond to the competitive implications of making employees into independent contractors. For example, under Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978,8 certain
persons not treated as employees were exempted from coverage even
48. Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 340 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 874
(1982) (quoting Senator Hugo Black's statement that the term "employee" in the FLSA was
given "the broadest definition that has ever been included in any one act."). Cobb v. Sun
Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 340 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 874 (1982) (citing 81
Cong. Rec. 7657 (1937)).
49. See, e.g., Doe v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 788 F.2d 411, 422-23 (7th Cir. 1986).
50. See General Inv. Corp. v. U.S., 823 F.2d 337, 340 (9th Cir. 1987); see also H. R.
REP. No. 1748, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978).
51. I.R.C. §3401 (c) (1990).
52. I.R.C. §3102.
53. I.R.C. §3301 (1990).
54. I.R.C. §3508 (1990).
55. Marvel v. United States, 719 F.2d 1507, 1514 (10th Cir. 1983).
56. Id.
57. Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296.
58. Pub. L. No. 95-600, §530 (as amended by Pub. L. No. 96-167, §9(d)), 93 Stat.
1278 (1979); Pub. L. No. 96-541, §1, 94 Stat. 3204 (1980); Pub. L. No. 97-248,
§269(c)(1),(2), 96 Stat. 552 (1982); Pub. L. No. 99-514, §1706(a), 100 Stat. 2781 (1986);
noted at 26 U.S.C. §3401 (1988).
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though they might meet the common law definitions. Section 530
liberated the employer from the burden of proving that a purported
independent contractor is in fact an independent contractor. If an
59
employer has any "reasonable basis", he may treat a worker as a
non-employee if other statutory considerations are met. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 extended the provisions of
Section 530 indefinitely. 0
What Congress provided on one hand, however, it took away by
the 1986 Tax Reform Act which added a subsection (d) to Section
530 and effectively removed the exemption for certain technical
fields.6" Section 530(d) contradicts the original intent of Section 530,
i.e., to prevent the IRS from making case-by-case retroactive em62
ployee versus independent contractor determinations. Now, individuals such as engineers and computer technicians must deal with all
of the previous uncertainties of IRS determinations and the common
3
law tests from which they had enjoyed a measure of freedom. Section 530(d) was enacted to eliminate the competitive inequities held
by firms who treated technical service specialists as independent contractors, thereby avoiding withholding obligations, while firms that
considered the same class of individuals as employees were responsi64
ble for employment taxes and benefits.
If the Internal Revenue Service reclassifies a worker from independent contractor to employee status for tax purposes, several negative consequences inure to an employer. The employer becomes liable for some or all of the income and Social Security taxes that
should have been withheld, and for matching FICA and FUTA
taxes.615 The employer may also lose the qualified status of employee
benefit and pension plans and, therefore, the associated expense deductions for these plans.6 6
67
Section 3509 of the Internal Revenue Code specifies an employer's tax liability for employment taxes when the IRS reclassifies
a worker from independent contractor to employee. This statute is
applicable if the employer is found not to have intentionally disre59. Rev. Proc. 85-18, §301, 1985-1 C.B. 518.
60. See supra note 58 for legislative history of Section 530.
61. Solomon & Schlesinger, Section 1706: Where It Came From And Where It Is Going, 66 TAXEs 50 (1988).
62. Id. at 52.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 54.
65. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. U.S., 503 F.2d 423 (2d Cir. 1974).
66. See Solomon & Schlesinger, supra note 61, at 55.
67. I.R.C. §3509 (1990).
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garded the requirements to -deduct and pay employment taxes.68 If
the employer intentionally disregards requirements to deduct and
pay employment taxes, the IRS may retroactively impose a variety
of taxes. Under Section "3403,69 the employer is liable for the pay-

ment of withholding tax'whether or not the tax was actually withheld. The employer can be assessed for both halves of the Social
Security taxes and the employer is liable for payment of federal unemployment taxes."0 Under Section 6672, a penalty of one hundred
percent of the tax may also be assessed against the employer. 1
Independent contractors are required to pay their own taxes and
the self-employment tax 2 is roughly equal to the combined employer-employee Social Security payments. In theory, the IRS
should receive roughly the same revenue regardless of how a worker
is classified, but in practice it is much harder to police independent
contractors than to monitor employers withholding taxes from regular employees. The IRS has estimated that misclassification of workers costs $1.56 billion a year in lost revenue. 73 IA an effort to recover
this revenue, the IRS has aggressively sought to close this perceived
loophole. 74 In the fiscal year ending September 30, 1989, the agency
examined 16,600 small business returns.7 5 It reclassified some 76,000
workers as employees and proposed assessments of $93.8 million. 6
Chief Judge Michael J. Melloy of the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Northern District of Iowa stepped to the forefront of
this issue with his ruling-on a priority claim of the IRS against the
bankruptcy estate of the owner of a trucking company.7 7 Although
the decision-was subsequently reversed and remanded, 8 his decision
is important as the initial judicial 'interpretation of Section 530. The
case involved the question of whether truck drivers should be considered employees and thus subject the debtor (company owner) to retroactive employment tax liability7 9 Judge Melloy recognized the dif68. I.R.C. §3509(c).
69. I.R.C. §3403 (1990).
70. See IRS Publication 539, Employment Taxes (Rev. Dec. 1988).
71.

Id.

72. I.R.C. §§1401, 1402(b) (providing that the 1990 tax rate for self-employed individuals will increase to 15.3%).
73.

Green, IRS Campaign on Payroll Taxes Sparks Clashes, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28,

1990 at 13, col. 1. IRS will audit 3500 business tax returns.
74.

See supra note 2 and accompanying text.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
See Green supra note 61, at 1.
McAtee v. IRS, (In re McAtee) 1989 WL146418 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Iowa).
In re McAtee, 115 B.R. 180 (N.D. Iowa, 1990).
McAtee, 1989 WL 146418 at 3.
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ficulty in making the determination when he stated, "Whether the
drivers were employees of independent contractors presents the
Court with a very close and different issue upon which reasonable
people might differ."80 The case is illustrative of the conflicting factors which arise in determining the status of individuals and of the
application of Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1979.81 The debtor
82
provided fringe benefits for the drivers such as medical insurance,
83
worker's compensatibn insurance and vacation time. Also subsequent to the period in question, the debtor changed the characterization of his drivers from independent contractors to employees to gain
some control over them.8 ' On the other hand, it appeared from the
record that both the debtor and the drivers intended the relationship
to be regarded as independent because of the Contract Labor Agreement between the parties and because the drivers paid their own
taxes.85 Judge Melloy determined that he did not have to decide the
common law status of the drivers because of the protection afforded
by Section 530.86 He added that the threshold inquiry is the applicability of Section 530(a)(3) which requires consistency by the tax87
payer in the way individuals are treated for tax purposes. In addi88
tion, Judge Melloy focused on the "safe havens" of Section 530 (a)
(2) in determining whether a taxpayer had a "reasonable basis" for
9
not treating an individual as an employee. He considered the
debtor's educational and employment background, the long-standing
recognized practice of a significant segment of the trucking industry
to consider drivers independent contractors, and the debtor's reliance
on the advice of his accountant in determining that the debtor quali90
fied for the relief under the safe harbor provisions of Section 530.
The decision was appealed by the Internal Revenue Service and
Judge Hansen, of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Iowa, agreed with Judge Melloy's decision that Section
530 would allow the debtor to escape liability, regardless of whether
the employer's workers would be considered employees under the
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id. at 4-5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
id.
See Rev. Proc. 85-18, 1985-1 C.B. 518.
McAtee, 1989 WL 146418 at 6.
Id.
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common law, if certain conditions were met."' Hansen stated, "Generally those conditions are whether the taxpayer consistently treated
his workers as independent contractors and had a reasonable basis
for so treating them." 2 The court found that for an employer to
meet its burden of establishing that it has consistently treated its
workers as independent contractors throughout their employment,
two conditions must be met.93 First, the employer must prove that
the employer has not treated an individual, whom it claims to be an
independent contractor, or any individual in a substantially similar
position (as defined in Section 530(a) (3)), for any period up and to,
including, the period in contention, as an employee. 4 Secondly, the
employer must show that the relevant period commences after December 31, 1978 and that all Federal tax returns required to be filed
with respect to such individual are consistent in that the individual is
not considered an employee during "such period." 95 Finally, the
court found "[i]f these two conditions are met . . . the individual

will be deemed to not be an employee unless 'the taxpayer had no
reasonable basis for not treating such individual as an employee.' "9
As to the reasonableness of the debtor claiming a worker as an independent contractor rather than an employee, the court in citing General Inventory Corporation v. United States,9 7 adhered to the
debtor's showing that his views were in conformity with a "significant segment of industry" test.98 The court found that something
more than the "personal observations of the debtor" are necessary
and left it to the trial court to "define the relevant 'significant segment of the industry' and to determine what proof is necessary to
show the practices of the chosen segment." 99
Judge Hansen found that as a matter of law, the court erred in
finding that the debtor had a reasonable basis for relying on his accountant.' 0 He explained that even though the debtor might have
had a limited educational background, the accountant's education
and experience in employment taxation and the applicable industry
91.

McAfee, 115 B.R. at 181.

92.

Id.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 182.
Id.
Id. at 183.
Id.
823 F.2d at 340.
115 B.R. at 184.
Id.
Id. at 185.
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1
must be established before reasonable reliance may be asserted."
The decisions in McAtee, are the first judicial attempts to interpret Section 530, and they clearly place a heavy burden upon an

102
Congress
employer to prove it is entitled to Section 530 protection.

unequivocally intended to protect employers who exercised good
0
faith in determining the status of workers' " and the legislative history specifies that there should be liberal construction in favor of
taxpayers.104 In practice, however, this Congressional directive seems
to have been ignored. In the past three years, tax assessments have
been issued in 90% of returns examined for employment tax issues
and in May 1989, the IRS expressed to Congress its concern about

10 5
The request was
the growing problem of employment tax abuse.

made to modify Section 530 as a means of regaining revenue lost
108 The IRS approach has
through the misclassification of workers.
the additional consequence of increasing competitive inequities because only selected companies in an industry are audited. Thus,
some businesses must count workers as employees while their
unaudited competitors can treat similar workers as independent con-

tractors.1 07 Companies that may have a borderline case should pay

particular attention to reporting requirements and should file all nec108
essary reports for every contractor earning $600 or more annually.
If it is clear that a nominal independent contractor will be considered an employee upon IRS examination, the business would be well
advised to change the status prospectively. While assessments for
previous years may result, a good faith, voluntary action to correct
109
the situation could encourage IRS leniency. The minimum assessment is likely to be the normal three years open under the general
IRS statute of limitations. 110 If, however, payroll returns have not
been filed, the IRS may take the position that there is no statute of
limitations because the statute only begins with the actual filing of
an applicable tax return. 1
101. Id. at 184-85.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 185.
Rev. Proc. 78-35, 1978-2 C.B. 536.
H.R. REP. No. 1748, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., at 5 (1978).
See Kenny & Hulen, DeterminingEmployee or Independent ContractorStatus, 20

TAx ADVISER 661, 669 n.40 (1989).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 668.

108.

Owens, "Caught in An IRS Crackdown",

SMALL BUSINESS REPORTs,

April 1990,

at 30.
109. Id.

110. Id.
111.

Id. at 34.
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B. Labor and Employment Standards
Whether an individual performing services for another is an employee or an independent contractor determines whether the individual is or is not covered by various labor statutes.112 Employees are
covered by and afforded the protections of the minimum wage and
overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act 113 - independent contractors are not. Employees are covered by and entitled to
the protections of the National Labor Relations Act1" - independent contractors are not. Employees are covered by and entitled to
the protections of federal and state equal employment opportunity
statutes' 15 - independent contractors are not. The statutory restrictions, coupled with the changing complexion of the workforce,"16

force employers to clearly prefer independent contractor relations.
They do not need to extend benefits, such as health insurance and
pensions, to independent contractors.1 17 In addition, the possibility of
union organization118 is eliminated, and the employer avoids state
and federal labor standards legislation. 1 9 Indeed from an employer's
perspective, having services performed by independent contractors
avoids virtually all the restrictions and obligations which arise when
an employer-employee relationship exists.
The right-to-control test which stood as the seminal benchmark
for determining employment status came under fire in the 1940's
when the United States Supreme Court was called upon to interpret
the social welfare legislation enacted in the 19301S.120 An approach,
now known as the "economic realities" test, emerged from this series
112. See e.g., Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§141-197 (1988).
113. 29 U.S.C. §§201-219 (1988).
114. 29 U.S.C. §§141-187 (1982).
115. See 5 U.S.C. §§5108-5115 (1988); 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e - 17 (1988). See, e.g.
Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965, IowA CODE §601A (1989).
116. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
117. Id.
118. See Bioff & Paul, Employees and Independent Contractors:Legal Implications of
Conversionfrom One to the Other, 4 COMM. & Err. 649 (1982) (principal motive for employ-

ers to prefer independent contractors is to avoid labor laws).
119.

See, e.g., Horn v. C.L. Osborn Cont. Co., 591 F.2d 318 (5th Cir.) reh'g denied,

595 F.2d 1221 (1979) (declaring independent contractors are not entitled to have purchasers
of their services comply with occupational safety and health standards under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act.) See also 29 U.S.C. §654 (1988).
120. See Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 26 (1947) (construing Social Security Act);

Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947) (construing the Fair Labor Standards Act); United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947) (construing the Social Security Act);
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944) (construing the National Labor Relations
Act).
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of cases. 2 ' Deciding whether to follow the common law right-to-control test or the broader economic realities test has been a source of
divergence as various labor and employment statutes are examined. 122 A review of prominent employment statutes will illustrate
the range of interpretation.
1. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).-Competing interests between unions which recognized that "employee" status was
necessary to provide workers with the full measure of protections
granted by Congress and state legislatures, and businesses who
sought to have services performed by independent contractors to
avoid the restrictions and obligations which were imposed by labor
legislation, have led to many difficult and controversial decisions by
the National Labor Relations Board 23 and by federal courts reviewing its decisions. 24 The Board has generally emphasized that it is
the right to control which is of paramount importance, not whether
control is actually exercised. 25
The applicability of common law distinctions between employees and independent contractors surfaced in a dispute involving
entiwhether newsboys selling a variety of Los Angeles papers were
26 The
bargaining.
tled to be represented for purposes of collective
Board applied common law criteria in a manner that permitted classifying the newsboys as employees. 27 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals found that the Board had ventured too far from common
the Court believed the NLRA obligated the
law standards, which
28
Board to follow.
The United States Supreme Court in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Incorporated, reversed the Ninth Circuit and broadly expanded the Labor Board's decision. 29 The Court found the common
meanlaw right to control test inherently unsuitable for defining the
80 It held
Act.
Relations
Labor
National
the
under
ing of employee
that the common law classification should be replaced by the broad
121. See, e.g. Brennan v. Partida, 492 F.2d 707, 709 (5th Cir. 1974).
122. See Air Transit, Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 1302 (1980); cf. Boston After Dark, Inc., 210
N.L.R.B. 38 (1974).

123. See NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254 (1968); Local 777, Seafares Int'l v.

NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, reh'g denied, 603 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
124. See Bioff and Paul, supra note 118, at 663.
125. NLRB v. Hearst Publications Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
126. In re Stockholders Publishing Co. & Newspapers Local 75, 28 N.L.R.B. 1006

(1941).
127.
128.
129.

Hearst Publications, Inc. v. NLRB, 136 F.2d 608, 612 (9th Cir. 1943).
322 U.S. at 129.
Id.

130. Id.
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interpretations set forth by the NLRA under which economic factors
have become the vital criteria for defining employee. 131 The Court

added that inconsistency in applying the common law test was widespread, 13 2 and that the policies served by the common law test were
not the same as the policies promoted by the National Labor Relations Act. 133 The Court concluded that when the common law distinctions would operate to deny protections of the NLRA to a large
group of workers who were subject to the evils that the statute was
designed to remedy, the applicability of the NLRA should be interpreted broadly, upon an examination of the "underlying economic
facts." 114
This decision met with considerable resistance, however, and
Congress overturned Hearst in the 1947 Taft-Hartly amendments to
the NLRA1'8 Subsequent to these amendments, the test which has
been consistently applied has been the common law right to control
test.13 6 Control has been construed to mean control of both the result
and the "manner and means" by which the purported employee
brings about the result.3 7 Clearly, "the more detailed the supervision and the stricter the enforcement standards, the greater the likelihood of an employer-employee relationship."1 38
The current NLRA definition was articulated in NLRB v. H &
H Pretzel Company3 9 In this case the sixth circuit recognized that
an employer who had ten successive collective bargaining agreements
with the union representing its drivers/salesmen could not unilaterally abrogate the collective bargaining process by leasing vehicles to
the drivers and declaring them independent contractors. 40 The court
upheld a finding by the NLRB that the company had committed an
unfair labor practice by replacing drivers who did not sign a putative
131.

Id.

132. Id. at 125-28.
133.

Id. at 129.

134. "It is inconceivable that Congress, when it passed the act, authorized the Board to
give to every word in the act whatever meaning it wished." H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess., at 18 (1947).
135. See NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254 (1968): Hilton Int'l Co. v.

NLRB, 690 F.2d 318 (2d Cir. 1982); Air Transit, Inc. v. NLRB, 679 F.2d 1095 (4th Cir.
1982); Local 777, Democratic Union Organizing Committee v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
136. NLRB v. H & H Pretzel Co., 831 F.2d at 654; Lodge 1858, Am. Fed'n of Gov't
Employees v. Webb, 580 F.2d 496 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 927 (1978).
137. Lorenz Schneider Co. v. NLRB, 517 F.2d 445, 451 (6th Cir. 1975).
138. 831 F.2d 650 (6th Cir. 1987).
139. Id. at 652.
140. Id. at 654.
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independent contractor agreement. 141 To reach this decision the sixth
circuit said the standard was the "right-to-control" test. 142 In determining control the court suggested looking at the intent of the parties, 143 the industry norm, 4 the relation of the work to the employer's regular business, 145 and other criteria pertaining to
supervision, duration and tools of the trade. 146 Other cases have held
that it is necessary to relinquish a sufficient degree of control over
the means and methods of accomplishing the primary business funcfide independent contractor relationship is to be
tion if a bona
47
maintained.
The protections afforded employees under the National Labor
Relations Act do not extend to allow a group of independent contractors to seek certification as a unit for collective bargaining purposes.' 48 Nor does it protect an independent contractor from being
terminated because of an attempt to organize with other independent
contractors 49 or from attempting to fix prices charged for services or
to restrict output in order to bargain more effectively with the purchaser of services. 150 The relative inequity is especially harsh in situations where independent contractors compete directly with tradi5
tional employees for wages and desirable working conditions.' ' The
2
inherent disparity led Professor H.W. Arthurs 1 to advocate a new
classification, "dependent contractors" to include self-employed
3
truck drivers, peddlers, taxi drivers and service station lessees.'
contractors, Arthurs asserted, should be eligible for
These dependent
54
unionization.1
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., Buffalo Courier-Express,Inc., 129 N.L.R.B. 932 (1960); Durkken Communication, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. 97 (1981)

147. See Production Worker Union, Local 707 v. NLRB, 793 F.2d 323, 325 (D.C. Cir.
1986).
148. Employees are protected from termination for these reasons, but independent con-

tractors are not. 29 U.S.C. §158 (a)(1)(3) (1988).
149. 29 U.S.C. §158 (a)(1)(3) (1988).
150. American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99 (1968). The Supreme Court

recognized that independent contractors compete directly with traditional employees for wages
and desirable working conditions.
151. Arthurs, The Dependent Contractor:A Study of the Legal Problems of Countervailing Power, 16 U. ToRoNTO L.J. 89 (1965).

152. Id. at 89.
153. Id. at 84-90.
154. See Bendel, The Dependent Contractor: An Unnecessary and Flawed Development
in CanadianLabor Law, 22 U. TORONTO LJ. 374 (1982) for a discussion of the developemtn
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The approach of Arthurs was adopted by Canadian courts in
permitting some classifications of independent contractors to engage
in collective bargaining. 55 Some Canadian courts have endorsed an
"organization test" which focuses on whether the services performed
are "integrated" with the activities of the principal.15 6 While at least
one United States commentator has advocated that the American
labor system abandon the common law tort concepts for defining the
boundaries of labor law, 157 the traditional analysis has femained intact. The interpretation of the meaning of employee under the
NLRA has one overriding benchmark, i.e. Congress in enacting the
Taft Hartley Amendment has expressly overruled a broader test and
has unequivocally reinforced the control test. 58 The current state of
the law is best summed up by Former Chief Judge Bazelon of the
D.C. Court of Appeals:
On consideration of that issue[whether parties are employees or independent], I find myself in a maze of precedents with few standards for decision discernable. I, of course, note that Congress has
quite clearly commanded that the common law definition of independent contractor be the basic guide for distinguishing between
employees and independent contractors. This does not mean that
considerations of labor policy are irrelevant but that they be considered in light of the common law test of control.1 59
2. Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).' 6°--The principles articulated in Hearst have continued to govern application of the employee definition of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 16 In the case of
Rutherford Food Corporation v. McComb, the parties disputed
whether a group of skilled specialists, paid for results only, were employees or independent contractors under the FLSA. 6 2 This case
was decided the same day the Court interpreted the meaning of employee under the Social Security Act. 6 3 In both cases the Court did
of Canadian law in this area.
155. Id. at 381; see Co-operators Ins. Ass'n v. Kearney, 1965 S.C.R. 106; Market Investigations, Ltd. v. Minister of Soc. Sec., 2 Q.B. 173, 184 3 All E.R. 732 (1968).
156. Perritt, Should Some Independent Contractors Be Redefined as "Employees"
Under Labor Law? 33 VILL. L. Rav. 989, 1034 (1988).
157. Id.
158. Local 814, International Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 512 F.2d 564, 568 (D.C.
Cir. 1975).
159. 29 U.S.C. §203.
160. See, e.g., Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244 (1945); Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assoc., 603 F.2d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 1979).

161. 331 U.S. 722 (1947).
162. United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947).
163. Id. at 706; Rutherford 331 U.S. at 730.
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not view the common law factors in isolation, but instead looked at
the practical exigencies of the workers' circumstances."" While
neither case explicitly referred to the "economic realities" test introduced in Hearst, there was a strong inference that the worker's particular situation must be assessed.165
The "economic realities" test was used expressly in Bartels v.
Birmingham.6 ' The Court outlined that while control is a factor in
the employer-employee relationship for the purposes of social legislation, employees are "those who as a matter of economic reality are
dependent upon the business to which they render service."16

This

test has continued to stand as the definition of employee as defined in
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.168
In the fifth circuit case of Mednick v. Albert Enterprises,Incorporated,the court of appeals revealed that the term "employee" was
not to be construed in its common law sense when used in any federal social welfare legislation." 9 The court examined the purpose of
the FLSA and asked whether the individual was the type of person
intended to be protected by the FLSA and whether he was in business for himself or dependent upon the business of another for his
living. 70 The Mednick court said the purpose of the FLSA was to
protect workers whose livelihood depended upon finding employment
in the business of others and looked at the skill level and sophistication of the worker, the intent of the employer to avoid wages and
benefits, and the difference in legal knowledge between the employer
and the worker in expanding the definition of employee.1
The application of the economic realities test has been charac72
terized by broad ranging rulings. Alien prisoners of war, undocumented aliens, 1 ' and professional nurses who worked simultaneously
with several different parties' 74 have all been considered covered by
the FLSA. The standard is whether, as a matter of economic fact,
the party is in business for himself,1 5 and control is only significant
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
U.S. 826

Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 730.
332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947).
Id.
See Goldberg v. Whitaker House Corp., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961).
508 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 300.
Id.
Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892 (1984).
Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir. 1988).
Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1059 (2nd Cir. 1988).
Donovan v. Tehco, Inc., 642 F.2d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1980).
Usery v. Pilgrim Equip. Co., Inc., 527 F.2d 1308, 1312 (5th Cir.); cert. denied, 429
(1976).
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when it shows an individual exerts such a control over a meaningful
part of the business that it stands as a separate entity. 176 It is not
relevant whether an employer may have had the intention to create
an employment relationship,'17 7 and the employer's self-serving labels
are not controlling. l78 It has, however, been recognized that an employer's admission that workers were employees covered by the
FLSA was highly probative evidence of an ultimate finding of an
17
employment relationship.
The test also rests on what the "agent" actually did do and not
on what he could do.'8 0 In Donovan v. Sureway Cleaners,18' the fact
that Sureway's operators of dry cleaning establishments possessed, in
theory, the power to set prices, determine their own hours, and independently advertise was not controlling when the court found that in
reality the operators worked the same hours, charged the same
prices and primarily relied on Sureway for advertising. 82
In applying the economic reality test all relevant information
must be considered.' 83 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
Brock v. Superior Care, Incorporated,84 looked at the issue of
whether professional nurses were employees protected by the overtime pay provisions of the FLSA. The court acknowledged that upon
review the skill level of the nurses, the degree of independent initiative exercised, and the level of permanence of the work relationship
all militated toward a finding of independent contractor status. 85
The court found an employment relationship to exist even though the
nurses were free to decline referrals at any time. 86 In so finding,
Judge Newman found that an employee may work for more than one
employer without losing coverage under the FLSA 87 and the person
does not have to rely on any employer for the primary source of
income. 88
In Patel v. Quality Inn South, 89 Judge Vance observed that,
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Brennan v. Partida, 492 F.2d 707, 709 (5th Cir. 1974)
Usery, 527 F.2d at 1312.
Id. at 1315.
656 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1981).
Id.
Id. at 1371.
642 F.2d at 143
840 F.2d at 1054.
Id. at 1060.
Id.
Id.
Id.
846 F.2d at 700.
Id. at 702.
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"Given the unequivocal language of the FLSA and its legislative history, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court has adopted an expansive definition of the term employee in its decisions under the
act." 190 The Patel Court found that an undocumented alien could
bring an action under the FLSA for unpaid wages and liquidated
damages even though the United States Supreme Court in Sure-Tan
precluded undocumented aliens from recovering an award of back
pay under the National Labor Relations Act.191
The United States Supreme Court has provided that,
"[b]readth of coverage was vital to [the FLSA's] mission. 1 92 The
FLSA was adopted in 1938 to eliminate substandard working conditions and it was considered "the most momentous and far-reaching
1 93
measure that [Congress has] considered for many years. 1 The
Fair Labor Standards Act definition of employee is characterized as
the broadest among labor statutes19 4 and from an employer standpoint its reach poses the greatest risk for nominal independent contractors to be considered employees and fall within its coverage.
gs-3. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 there is no requirement that there be an ongoing employment relationship at the time
of the alleged discrimination. 96 However, in order for an adverse
action to be prohibited by Title VII, it must occur in an employment
setting. Thus the issue of whether a worker is an employee 97is often
the focal point of an employer's defense in Title VII cases.'
Title VII defines "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees."198 "Employee" is broadly defined as "an individual employed by an employer."' 19 There is no elaboration in the statute, nor any evidence in
how expansively the definition of
the legislative history regarding
"employee" is to be read.200 In Hishon v. King & Spaulding,2° ' the
190. 467 U.S. at 892.
191. Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 516 (1950).
192. 83 CONG. REc. 9262 (1938).
193. See Donovan v. Dial Am. Mktg. Inc., 757 F 2d 1376, 1384 (3d Cir. 1985).
194. 42 U.S.C. §2000(e)-2000(e)-17 (1988).
195. 42 U.S.C. §2000(e)-2000(e)-17 (1988) (hereinafter refered to as Title VII).
196. See, e.g., Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d at 339-41 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 874 (1982); Lutcher v. Musician Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 1980).
197. 42 U.S.C. §2000(e)(b) (1988).
198. 42 U.S.C. §2000(e)(f) (1988).
199. See, e.g. Cobb, 673 F.2d at 339; Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 830 (D.C.
Cir. 1979).
200. 678 F.2d 1022 (11th Cir. 1982).
201. Id. at 1027.
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Court found that neither the Act nor its legislative history gives any
guidance in defining "employee. ' 20 2 It appears that the only comment made in Congress was that the term "employer" was intended
to have its common dictionary meaning, except as qualified by the
Act. 20 3 Thus, who is entitled to the protections afforded those individuals within the jurisdictional scope of the statute is subject to judicial construction. Courts interpreting Title VII have turned to two
other sources for guidance in distinguishing between employees and
independent contractors: the common law and judicially developed
tests under other statutes. 0 4
The United States Supreme Court has not spoken on this issue
with regard to Title VII, but lower court decisions have placed the
interpretation somewhere between the broad economic realities test
of the FLSA and the control test of the NLRA decisions. 20 5 In
EEOC v. Zippo ManufacturingCompany the court stated that while
the economic realities test was appropriate for FLSA cases, it was
not the correct test for Title VII cases because Congress intended a
more limited objective in the enactment of Title VII.20 6 In Spirides
v. Reinhardt, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals provided that because Title VII was remedial in character, it should be liberally construed, and ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the complaining party.20 7 The court looked at both the economic realities of
the work relationship 20 8 and the extent of the employer's right to
control the "means and manner" of the worker's performance, 20 9 and
suggested that both elements need to be incorporated into the analysis.21° The factors the court deemed important were: (1) the right to
control; (2) the kind of occupation; (3) the skill required; (4) who
furnishes the equipment used and the work place; (5) length of time
individual has worked; (6) method of payment; (7) how the work
was terminated; (8) whether annual leave was given; (9) whether the
work is an integral part of the business of the employer; (10)
whether the worker accumulates retirement benefits; (11) whether
the "employer" pays Social Security taxes; and (12) the intention of
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

110 CONG. REC. 203. See Spirides, 613 F.2d 826; Lutcher, 633 F.2d 883.
See Spirides, 613 F.2d 826; Lutcher, 633 F.2d 883.
Spirides, 613 F.2d at 826; Lutcher, 633 F.2d at 883.
713 F.2d at 37.
613 F.2d at 831.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the parties. 11
This list is similar to the RESTATEMENT but it adds factors involving employee benefits.212 Thus the components of the Spirides
hybrid test are common law principles and considerations of employee benefits and taxes, together with a general instruction to consider the purpose of the legislation. 213 This approach has been followed in a long line of cases that have viewed the hybrid test as a
balancing test involving a substantial degree of discretion.21 4 In applying the hybrid approach the courts look at the economic realities
of the situation but focus on the employer's right to control the employee as the most important factor in determining employee status.215 The approach was challenged by the Sixth Circuit in Armbruster v. Quinn.2"' The court rejected the Spirides reasoning and
said that the term employee should be construed as broadly under
Title VII as it is under the FLSA.117 The court emphasized the
broad remedial goals of Title V11 218 and held that the statute "must
be read in light of the mischief to be corrected and the ends to be
attained."21 9 The Armbruster court extended "coverage to all those
the statue is designed to
who are in a position to suffer the harm
220
prevent, unless specifically excluded.
The opportunity for discrimination in the work place certainly
exists anytime someone performs services for another. As soon as
any selection or payment occurs, the chance of discriminatory treatment arises. The Armbruster court said the aim of the Title VII was
"to rid from the world of work the evil of discrimination. ' 22 By its
express language, however, Title VII exempts many workers and employers from its provisions. This dichotomy has resulted in a divergence of decisions on similar fact situations. In Nanavati v. Burdette
Tomlin Memorial Hospital22 a physician with staff privileges at a
hospital was found to be an independent contractor under Title VII
so that discrimination charges could not be pursued, while in Doe v.
211.
212.

Id. at 831-32.
Id.

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

See, e.g., Cobb, 673 F.2d at 341; Lutcher, 633 F.2d at 883.
See, e.g., Cobb, 673 F.2d at 341; Lutcher, 633 F.2d at 833.
711 F.2d 1332, 1341 n.7 (6th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1340.
Id. at 1339.

218.

Id. at 1340 (quoting Dunlop & Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139, 145 (6th Cir.

1977)).
219. Id. at 1341.
220. Id. at 1340.
221.
222.

857 F.2d 96, 102 (3d Cir. 1988).
788 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1986).
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St. Joseph's Hospital,223 it was decided that Title VII may afford a
remedy to a non-employee physician for discrimination by the
hospital.224
Clearly Congress did not intend all employers to be subject to
Title VII in their relationships with all suppliers of services.225 Conversely a rigid application of the common law would allow employers
to evade their legal responsibilities. The hybrid right of control/economic realities test appears to effectively reconcile the conflicting
pressures and represents a workable guideline for determining the
application of Title VII and its progeny of anti-discrimination legislation 226 to work place situations.
4. Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990.-On July 26,
1990, President Bush signed into law the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (hereinafter "ADA").227 The purpose of the ADA
was "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities. ' 228
The ADA initially will cover employers who have 25 or more employees who work at least 20 or more calendar weeks in a year and
will become effective in July, 1992.229

The ADA prohibits discrimination against a "qualified individual with a disability" concerning job applications, hiring, advancement, discharge, compensation, training or other terms, and conditions or privileges of employment. 23 0 According to the administrative
guidelines, there are three basic provisions to assure a match between employment selection criteria and an applicant's actual ability
to do the job.231 These criteria are: (1) the disabled individual should
not be disqualified because of his or her inability to perform nonessential or marginal job functions; (2) screening and selection criteria should be job-related and consistent with business necessity; and
(3) reasonable accommodation should be provided to assist the disable in meeting job criteria.23 2
223. Id. at 424.
224. Spirides, 613 F.2d at 828-30.
225. See The Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000(e) (1982); The
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000(e)(k) (1982); The Age Discriminaton in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §652 (6) (1982).
226. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§12101-12213 (Law Co-op.
Supp. 1990) [hereinafter ADA].
227. ADA §12101(b)(1).
228. ADA §12111(5)(A).
229. ADA §12112(a).
230. EEOC Compl. Man. (August 29, 1990).
231. Id.
232. See ADA §§12111-12117.
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While most states currently prohibit employers from discriminating against individuals with disabilities, the ADA will impose
greater burdens on employers. 23 3 The cost associated with compliance and providing reasonable accommodation unless the accommodation would impose an "undue hardship"2 34 on the employer will
place a considerable burden on an employer. This standard is considerably higher than treating all employees equal and it is expressly
higher than the "de minimus" standard 23 5 which limits accommodation only to that which would require no more than a small cost to
the employer. It will also likely push employers to seek ways to circumvent the application of the ADA and to gain a competitive advantage over businesses burdened with the added cost of compliance.
Because the ADA applies only to the employment relationship a further benefit of expanded use of independent contractors may result.236 This will be particularly true for smaller companies who want
to have less bona fide employees than the minimum required for falling within coverage under the ADA.23 7
Unlike statutes which prohibit discrimination based upon race,
gender or age, where an employer can readily identify a covered individual, it may be difficult for a manager to determine whether an
individual is disabled, for whom reasonable accommodations must be
made. The term employee is defined under Section 12111 of the
ADA as "an individual employed by an employer." 23 8 This is the
same definition of employee as that found in the Fair Labor Standards Act.2 39 Judge Vance of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
opined that, "It would be difficult to draft a more expansive definition. '' 24 0 As has been previously noted, the legislative history of the
FLSA suggests that such a broad definition is appropriate.2 41 The
ADA defines "employer" in the same manner as Title VII except
it only includes
that for the first years after the date of enactment,
242
employers who employ 25 or more employees.
The Americans with Disabilities Act incorporates the enforce233. ADA §12111(10)(A).
234. See, e.g., TransWorld Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
235. See ADA §12111(5).
236. ADA §12111(5). As of July, 1992, businesses with 25 or more employees will be
covered. After this phase-in period, as of July 1994, any employer with 15 or more employees
will be subject to the law. ADA §12111(5).
237. ADA §12111(4).
238. 29 U.S.C.A. §203 (e)(1) (West 1978 & Supp. 1990).
239. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d at 702.
240. See supra notes 165-167 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
242. ADA §12117 (a).
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ment provisions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.43
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is responsible for
investigation charges of discrimination. The EEOC is also required,
as part of its enforcement responsibilities, to provide technical assistance to employers and interested individuals and organizations re244
garding their rights and obligations under the Act.
While it will be many years before appellate courts will interpret these definitions, the legislative history of the ADA14" and its
remedial purpose clearly demonstrate that a very broad reading of
"employee" will arise from review. The ADA provides one further
trap for the unwary in the event nominal independent contractors
are engaged to perform traditional employment functions. 24 6
There is certainly an incentive, however, to legitimately engage
independent contractors to perform services to avoid falling under
the purview of the ADA. Language in the ADA cautions against
using any type of contractual or other arrangement to circumvent
the ADA, including the use of employment agencies or labor unions,
if the effect is to screen out qualified individuals with a disability.2 47
Any attempt to alter the characterization of existing employees to
avoid compliance will be a clear violation. If, however, an election is
made to have services performed by independent parties or businesses who are not dependent upon the business, and all control is
relinquished over the manner and means over how these services are
performed, the reach of the ADA may be able to be avoided. 248 Because of the dire consequences of noncompliance, it may be well advised to seek technical assistance from the EEOC before proceeding.
A review of the labor and employment decisions reveals that
courts look at unequal bargaining power and superimpose protective
construction when the circumstances most acutely demand it. In
cases where the economic realities test is employed, the degree of
dependence on the business with which the "employees" are connected determines employee status. 49 When the relative bargaining
power is less disparate, the "hybrid analysis"2 0 is utilized which
views the economic realities of the relationship in light of common
law principles of agency, and the right of the employer to control the
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

ADA §12206(a).
S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1989).
ADA §12112.
ADA §12112.
ADA §12111(5).

248. Usery, 527 F.2d at 1311-12.
249. Cobb, 673 F.2d at 341.
250.

Id.
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worker is the most important factor.2 51 Where collective bargaining
significantly equalizes the power of employers and workers, the more
narrow common law control test is employed.252
C.

Workers' Compensation Impact

53 soPrior to the enactment of workers' compensation statutes
ciety was governed by the assumption that wages bargained for by
the employee were presumably proportioned to the risk involved in
the work.25 4 This attitude was guided by the broad nineteenth cen255 The
tury political, economic and social objective of "progress.1
rights of property developed by the founding fathers to safeguard a
society of landowners and small tradesmen militated toward an insulation of entrepreneurs from liability. In Farwell v. Boston &
Worcestes Railroad,5 8 Justice Shaw, in articulating the "fellow servant" doctrine' 57 was motivated by the desire to free railroads and
2 58
businesses generally from responsibility for injuries to employees.
The storm of expansion prevalent at that time and courts imbued
with the ideas of rugged individualism, made law that enabled businesses to thrive. The question of how far entrepreneurs should be
allowed to insulate themselves from liability in order to stimulate
enterprise was begged by the necessity of caring somehow for persons injured in the course of enterprise. It was also recognized that
done than was currently being done by employers to
more could be2 59
avoid injuries.
The question of who bore the risk for employees' injuries was
essentially part of the general question of how the risks and costs of
injuries should be borne. The administration of risk is conducted in
pursuit of three discernible goals: (1) stimulation toward reducing
costs by preventing injuries; (2) minimizing the administrative expense of shifting and distributing that cost; and, (3) securing persons
28 °
against catastrophic loss from serious injuries.

251. Id.
252. See supra notes 248-250 and accompanying text. Employee is defined for ERISA
by reference to NLRB concepts. 29 U.S.C. §1002(6) (1982).
253. See, e.g., DOWNEY, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 15 (1924); 1 BRADBURY, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (2d ed. 1914).
254. Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842).
255. See Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good Life, 2 U. CHIc. L. REv. 501.
509-12 (1935).

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

See Farwell, supra note 254.
Id.
See Steffen, supra note 255, at 511.
Id.
Id. at 509-10.
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Workmen's compensation statutes were promoted on the principle that the risks of injury should be borne by industry. 6 1 This principle related the belief that the person who has the most knowledge
and control of an employee's activities is in the best position to introduce and enforce safety measures and thus prevent injuries.2 62 The
general purpose of the various state workmen's compensation statutes which developed in the 1930's was to remove the burden of industrial and commercial accidents from the victim and to allocate
the cost of these accidents over the consumers of the product or the
customers of the business.26 3 The acts would guarantee prompt, limited compensation for an employee's work injuries, regardless of
fault, as an inevitable cost of production. 6 4
Workmen's compensation acts were "intended to apply to workers whose services form a regular and continuing part of the business
or cost of the product. ' 265 They were not intended, however, to impose potential liability on a businessman for every worker who performs work on the business premises. Twentieth century legislation
for the protection of employees has adopted the independent contractor distinction as an express or implied limitation of coverage. The
statutes limit liability to injuries suffered by an employee which arise
out of and in the course of his employment. 266 This definition has
resulted in many close 267 and unusual findings, including situations
where a party was found to be an employer in one case and an inde268
pendent contractor in another.
As discussed above the traditional test of whether a workman is
an employee or an independent contractor for the purpose of tort
liability was the right to control, which was adopted from the com261. See 81 AM. JuR. 2d Workmen's Compensation §2 (1976); see also Kirkwood v.
Indus. Comm'n, 416 N.E. 2d 1078, 1081 (Ill. 1981) (stating that "workmen's compensation
law is concerned not with injuries by the employee, but injuries to the employee. .. " (emphasis supplied)).
262. See Kirkwood, 416 N.E. 2d at 1078.
263. Id.
264. See, e.g., Evans v. Naihaus, 326 So. 2d 601, 604 (La. App. 1976).
265. Id.
266. See e.g., ALASKA STAT. 23.30.005-.270 (1986); ILL. REV. STAT. 977, ch. 48 para.
138.1 (1970).
267. Grothe v. Olafson, 659 P.2d 602, 606 (Alaska 1983); Sandy v. Salter, 541 S.W.2d
929, 931 (Ark. 1976).

268. For instance, the Illinois Industrial Commission and the Illinois Supreme Court
found Herman Kirkwood to be an employer of individuals applying siding in Kirkwood Bros.
Constr. v. Industrial Comm'n, 381 N.E.2d 697 (Il1. 1978), and less than three years later, he

was denied workers' compensation as a claimant when working with another company in applying siding in Kirkwood v. Industrial Comm'n, 416 N.E.2d 1078, 1081 (Ill. 1981).
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mon law master-servant concept. 2 9 This test considered the degree
of control that can be exercised over a workman and the performance of his work as significant factors in determining whether the
270
master is to be held vicariously liable for the acts of his servant.
Professor Larson in his seminal treatise on workmen's compensation 271 suggested that this test is not appropriate in determining
whether a worker is an employee for purposes of workmen's compensation acts. 272 Larson maintained that workmen's compensation law
is concerned not with injuries by the employee, but injuries to the
employee, and the right to control his activities does not have the
same significance as it has in determining whether the employer
should be responsible for the acts of his servants. 273 He found it
more important to consider the nature of the claimant's work in relation to the regular business of the employer.27 4 This consideration is
stressed in two distinct parts: the nature of the claimant's work, and
its relation to the employer's work.27 5
Some courts have expressly adopted the "relative nature of the
work test" enunciated by Larson. 6 Other courts have approved remedial construction in principle, but cited the need to maintain business reliance on the traditional "control" rule.2 7 The underlying
theme throughout the cases is whether the services constitute an inis,
tegral part of the putative employer's regular business; that
278
whether the services were substantial, essential and recurring. If
the duration of the effort is sufficient to amount to the hiring of conservices, courts will find an employment relationship to extinuing
ist. 279 Another prominent factor is the amount of supervision and
control exercised. 20 This control is beyond merely the right to enhaving sufficient knowlgage or discharge the person and extends to
281 and minimize risk.282
direction
provide
to
edge of the operation
269. See supra Part C and accompanying text.
270. Id.
271.
272.

1 C.A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1980).
Id. at §43.42, 43.50.

273. Id.
274. Id. at § 43.52.
275. Id.
276. See, e.g., Grothe, 659 P.2d at 605; Barton v. Crawford & Co., 553 P.2d 716, 719
(N.M. 1976); Sandy, 541 S.W.2d at 931; Evans, 326 So. 2d at 604.
277. See, e.g., Kirkwood, 416 N.E.2d at 1082.
278. See LARSON, supra note 271, at 43.52.

279. Id.
280.

Id.

281. Id.
282.

Id.
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It is particularly important for an employer to properly determine whether it is responsible for workers' compensation coverage,
because an injured employee may elect to maintain a tort action for
damages rather than claim more limited compensation under workers' compensation if workers' compensation insurance is not properly
obtained. 8 3 Thus an employer still faces all obligations under the
workers' compensation acts and has not limited its liability against
broader tort claims. At least one court has also said that if an employer fails to secure workers' compensation insurance, and the employee elects to maintain an action at law, the employer may not
plead the employee's comparative negligence as a defense.284
A number of state courts have recognized that in workers' compensation cases, the employee-independent contractor issue cannot
be decided without consideration of the remedial statutory purpose.2 86 This is consistent with federal courts that have recognized
that the distinction between tort policy and social legislation policy
justifies departures from common law principles when claims are
that one is excluded as an independent contractor from a statute protecting "employees. 28 6
While the remedial purposes of workers' compensation legislation militate toward a broad finding of employee status, the express
exclusion of "independent contractors" is purposeful, and will continue to be recognized. There are situations where the goals of workers' compensation legislation are best served by imposing the risk of
"no-fault" work injuries directly on the provider, rather than the recipient, of a compensated service. This goal is certainly clear when
the provider of service has the primary control over work safety, is
best equipped to distribute the risk and cost of injury as an expense
of his own business, and has independently chosen the burdens and
benefits of self-employment. No significant deviation from present
construction is likely, because as articulated in Kirkwood v. Industrial Commission,28 7 "[b]usiness relations have been structured in
consideration of them, and insurance protection against compensation claims have been tailored with these tests in mind. It could be
unnecessarily disruptive, and expose employers to risks against which
283. Grothe, 659 P.2d at 604.
284. Id. at 605.
285.

See, e.g., Woody v. Waibel, 553 P.2d 492, 495-97 (Or. 1976); Matter of Kokesh,

411 N.W. 2d 559, 562 (Minn. App. 1987); Anton v. Industrial Comm'n, 688 P.2d 192, 197200 (Ariz. App. 1984).

286. See, e.g., Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130-32 (1947); U.S. v. Silk, 331
U.S. 704, 713-18 (1947); Rutherford Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722-30 (1946).
287.

Kirkwood, 416 N.E.2d at 1082.
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28
they have had no opportunity to insure."
It has been consistently decided that parties who engage individuals on a regular and recurring basis to perform services for their
trade or business will be considered to have employees for purposes
89 Courts will likely interpret
of workers' compensation coverage.
to the
close questions in favor of finding employee status pursuant
290
coverage.
compensation
workers'
of
remedial purposes

IV.

ILLUSTRATIVE OCCUPATIONS

Courts have frequently held that in applying the Silk factors,
allowances must be made for those operational characteristics that
are unique or intrinsic to the particular business or industry, and to
the workers they employ. 2 91 Regardless of what test is applied, the
weight courts give to various factors is dependent upon the relationship of the provider of the services to the recipient and the perception of the norms of this vocational or occupational field. Three diverse areas have been selected to illustrate the dynamics of applying
the test of whether an individual is characterized as an employee or
as an independent contractor.29 2 These fields were not chosen because they represent areas of focus by any government agency or
293 but instead were
because they are the most acute areas of abuse,
selected because the fields represent a cross section of the issues
presented.294 Agricultural workers are typically lower paid, highly
2 95
Sales
controlled and operate strictly on the landlord's premises.
much
with
individuals
professionals are often highly compensated
more latitude as to hours of work, methods and means employed,
296 The service sector broadly
and where the work is to be performed.
covers all economic strata and because of its growing importance in
297
Yet the
the United States economy, a discussion is warranted.
288. Id.
289.

See, e.g., Grothe, 659 P.2d at 605; Barton, 553 P.2d at 719.

290. See supra Part III and accompanying text.

291. Donovan v. Dial Am. Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376, 1384 (3rd Cir.); cert. denied,
Dial Am. Mktg., Inc. v. Brock (1985); Mitchell v. John R. Crowley & Bros., 292 F.2d 105,

108 (5th Cir. 1961).
292. Id.
293. Id.
294.

See Bioff & Paul, supra note 118 (discussing in detail the independent contractor/

employee dichotomy in the newspaper distribution industry); see also Harter, Are They Em-

ployees or Independent Contractors?, 29 LAB. L.J. 779 (1982) (discussing the trucking

industry).
295.
296.
297.

See Harter, supra note 294, at 779.
Id.
Id.
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characterization of individuals as employees or independent contractors in each of these endeavors is a complex and inexact science. By
reviewing how tests are applied to these fields, analogous determinations may be made when confronted with the same issue in other
fields.
A. Sales Professionals
The issue of whether a sales representative is an employee has
arisen most frequently in the context of discrimination allegations.2 18
Because being an employee is the threshold inquiry for coverage
under Title VII and related anti-discrimination statutes, 89 this characterization is critical. In Hickey v. Arkla Industries, Incorpo-

rated,300 the Fifth Circuit examined the circumstances of a former

district sales representative who voluntarily left the employ of
Arkla.30 1 The facts revealed that Mr. Hickey was subsequently given
an exclusive territory, was not allowed to sell products directly competitive with the Arkla products he sold, was required to attend
Arkla sales meetings and was provided with office space and secretarial service by Arkla.3 2 In addition, Arkla set the prices at which
Hickey could sell its products and placed credit limits on Hickey's
customers.3 03
Despite these substantial measures of control exercised by Arkla
over Mr. Hickey, the court found that Hickey was an independent
contractor and thus not entitled to coverage under the ADEA.3 04 It
reached this conclusion by employing the hybrid test enunciated in
Spirides and by focusing in particular on whether the individual was
economically dependent for his livelihood on the business to which he
renders service.3 0 5 While the court cited five factors to consider in
reaching this conclusion,30 6 it focused specifically on the opportunities for profit and loss, 307 the permanency of the relationship and
whether the success of the enterprise depended upon the individual's
298. Brock v. M.W. Fireworks, 814 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1987); EEOC v. Zippo Mfg.
Co., 713 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1983); Hickey v. Arkla Indus., Inc., 699 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1983).
299. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§626-634 (1982).
300. Hickey, 699 F.2d 748.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 750-51.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 752.
305. Id.
306. The court listed: (1) degree of control; (2) opportunities for profit or loss; (3)

investment in facilities; (4) permanency of relationship; and (5) skill required. Id. at 752 (citing Usery v. Pilgrim Equip. Co., 527 F.2d at 1311).
307. Id. at 752.
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"initiative, judgment and foresight."308 The court distinguished "economic dependence" from Hickey's close ties to Arkla by saying that
any business is dependent upon a major supplier and while serious
economic adjustments may result from the loss of such a supplier
serve to establish 'economic dependence'
this "will not necessarily
309
loss.
the
great
however
It is important to note that the court looked at the existence of
an agreement which was cancellable by either party upon thirty
days' notice 310 and the fact that Hickey had established a corporate
vehicle for his sales of Arkla products.31 The court also focused on
the fact that Arkla did not control the manner Hickey employed in
marketing its product nor which customers he could contact within
the territory. 12
The hybrid test was also applied by the Third Circuit in
E.E.O.C. v. Zippo Manufacturing Company31 3 in finding that the
company's district managers with defined territories were independent contractors. 14 The court examined factors such as the lack of
control Zippo exercised over the means and manner of sales practices of the district managers.315 The individuals were free to establish their own business organizations, were not required to account to
Zippo for their daily activities and had the right to terminate the
relationship on thirty days' notice. 31 The court also considered the
fact that the district managers received a commission as a percent of
sales, rather than a salary, and the potential for this profit was the
31 7
result of their own initiative and within their control. The militating factors noted in the finding of independent contractor status,
however, were the length of time the district managers were with
Zippo and the level of economic dependence because they were required to sell only Zippo products. 18 In balancing the conflicting issues, the court determined that the district managers "were indepenliberal 'economic realities'
dent contractors even under the more
3 19
cases."
FLSA
standards as applied in
308.
309.

Id.
Id.

310. Id.
311. Id.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

Id.
713 F.2d 32 (1983).
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id. at 34.

317. Id. at 38.
318. Id.
319. Id.
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The issue of the employment status of manufacturer representatives was also addressed in Armbruster v. Quinn3 20 and Unger v.
Consolidated Food Corporation2 1 but different results were obtained. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals focused on evidence of
the possibility of advancement within the company as well as
whether the representatives handled products other than those of the
defendant in finding employment status.32 2 It also considered the hiring and termination process and the payment of company-paid benefits and advances.3 2 3 In Unger, sales representatives deemed employees were required to file regular sales reports and to exclusively
represent its product. 24 They were paid business expenses, were provided a regular draw against commissions, and taxes were
withheld.32 5
Section 3508 of the Internal Revenue Code was added in the
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982.21 This section
provides non-employment treatment of direct sellers if three tests are
met. 27 Two of the tests are consistent with the recent decisions addressing sales professionals. Section 3508(2)(B) provides that the direct seller must receive all remuneration directly related to sales
rather than from hours worked. 28 Section 3508(2)(C) requires that
the services performed by the person must be pursuant to a written
contract which specifies that the person will not be treated as an
employee for federal tax purposes.32 9
Section 3121(d) of the Insurance Contributions Act 330 defines
"employee" to mean any full-time life insurance salesman or a traveling salesman personally engaged full time in the solicitation of orders on behalf of a principal.3 3 1 This Act also exempts from coverage, however, individuals with a substantial investment in facilities
and individuals performing sales services in the nature of a single
transaction. 2
320. 711 F.2d at 1332 (6th Cir. 1983).
321. 657 F.2d 909 (7th'Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 456 U.S. 1002 (1982).
322. See 711 F.2d at 1342 n.9.
323. Id.
324. See Unger, 657 F.2d at 909.
325. See id. at 916 n.8.
326. 26 U.S.C. §3508(2) (orginally enacted as Pub. L. No. 97-248, Title II, §269(a),
Sept. 3, 1982, 96 Stat. 551).
327. 26 U.S.C. §3508(2)(A)-(C) (1982).
328. 26 U.S.C. §3508(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (1982).
329. 26 U.S.C. §3508(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (1982).
330. I.R.C. §3121(d).
331. I.R.C. §3121(d)(3)(B) (1982).
332. I.R.C. §3121(d)(3)(D) (1982).
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When these disparate sources are examined, the universal qualities which seem to consistently influence the outcome are: (1) the
presence of a written, freely terminable agreement;33 3 (2) compensation solely on results; (3) an investment in facilities; and (4) the individual being exclusively responsible for taxes. These factors appear
to override substantial control exercised by exclusive territories, reand potential losses
quirements not to market competing 3products
34
line.
product
the
resulting from losing
Any organization which distributes its product or service by independent sales professionals faces increased scrutiny from the Internal Revenue Service because the Internal Revenue Service Audit
Manual has noted that sales organizations are suspect and subject to
major abuses.3 35 Under "known or probable areas of noncompliance"
the manual lists sales organizations and specifically identifies, inter
alia independent contractors as a source of selection of returns for
examination.336
B. Agricultural Workers
The minimum wage, overtime, record keeping and child labor
provisions of the FLSA most often bring the issue of employment
status of agricultural workers before appellate courts. In a number
of agricultural cases, courts have applied six criteria to find employment, rather than a contractual relationship.3 3 The first factor is
once again control, and courts have held that even if supervision does
not include the details of harvesting or setting the hours of work, the
workers may still be employees if the employer has a right to control
the farm operation as a whole.3 38 The opportunity for profit and loss
is important. However, opportunity for profit does not mean merely
an opportunity for increased remuneration through greater effort. In
Donovan v. Gillmore, the court held that a reduction in money
earned by workers is not a loss sufficient to satisfy the criteria for
independent contractor status. 339 The Gillmore court also examined
the capital investment involved and said large expenditures of risk
capital and non-negligible items such as work gloves or pails consti333. But see infra note 338 and accompanying text.
334. Id.
335.

INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, PART IV, AUDIT No. 4646 (1986).

336. Id. at Exhibit 4640-1.
337. See, e.g. United States Dept. of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529 (7th Cir. 1987);
Beliz v. W.H. McLead & Sons Packing Co., 765 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1985); Real v. Driscoll
Strawberry Assoc., Inc., 603 F.2d 748 (9th Cir. 1979).
338. 835 F.2d at 1536.
339. 535 F. Supp. 154 (N.D. Ohio), appeal dismissed, 708 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1982).
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tute a capital investment. s40 Moreover, the district court found the
farm workers' disproportionately small stake in the operation to be
an indication that their work was not independent. 341
While the degree of skill required is a consideration, it is noted
that the development of occupational skills is also required of good
employees in any line of work.3 42 An individual's qualities which
make him a more effective worker do not change the nature of the
employment relationship.343 The permanency and duration of the relationship is important although many agriculture related jobs are
seasonal by nature. The Gillmore court found that however temporary a seasonal job may be, if it is permanent and exclusive for the
harvest season, it is sufficient to suggest an employment relationship 44 The remaining factor is whether the activity of the employee
is an integral part of the farmer's business. 45
While these factors are frequently discussed, the central focus
appears to be the economic dependence of the workers on the
farmer. In Usery v. Pilgrim Equipment Company, 46 the Fifth Circuit advised that, "[i]t is dependence that indicates employment status.

.

. [and] [e]ach test must be applied with that ultimate notion

in mind. 3 47
The decision in S.G. Borello & Sons, Incorporated v. Department of Industrial Relations,348 provides an in-depth and well reasoned discussion of the issues associated with whether agriculture
workers should properly be considered employees or independent
contractors.349 In Borello, the California Supreme Court held that
agricultural workers who were hired to harvest cucumbers under a
written sharefarmer agreement were "employees" for the purposes of
the state worker's compensation statute.3 50 Under the California
Worker's Compensation Act, "independent contractors" are defined
as those who render service for a specified recompense, for a specified result, under the control of the principal as to the result of his
work only and not as to the means by which such result is
340. Id. at 162.
341.
342.
343.
344.

Id.
835 F.2d at 1537.
Id.
535 F. Supp. at 162-63.

345. 603 F.2d at 754-55.
346.

527 F.2d 1308 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 826 (1976).

347. Id. at 1311-12 (emphasis in original).
348.
349.

48 Cal. 3d 341, 769 P.2d 399, 256 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1989).
Id.

350. 48 Cal. 3d at

,

769 P.2d at 406-408, 256 Cal. Rptr. at

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol8/iss2/3

-.

34

Bruntz: The Employee/Independent Contractor Dichotomy: A Rose is Not Alwa
Employee/Contractor Dichotomy

1991]

accomplished." 1
Despite the existence of a detailed sharefarmer's agreement, the
52
terms of which were explained to the sharefarmers, the California
Supreme Court determined that the employer did not show that the
353 This conclusion was
harvesters were independent contractors.
based upon a finding that the growers exercised pervasive control
over the whole operation on land they owned and cultivated for their
own account.3 54 The harvesting was simple manual labor, that was
learned quickly and involved no particular skill, and the workers had
with the growers and did not
a seasonal, but permanent relationship
3 55
business.
in
out
hold themselves
The Borello court gave weight to the fact that the sharefarmers
that they conexpressly agreed that they were not employees and
3 56 Justice Eaglebenefits.
and
sciously accepted the attendant risks
son reasoned that "[T]he protections conferred by the Act have a
public purpose beyond the private interests of the workers themselves." 357 He looked at the purpose of the worker's compensation
legislation and determined that the statute was enacted because of
society's recognition that if the financial risk of job injuries is not
which produce them, it may fall upon the
placed upon the 35businesses
8
public treasury.
The court did, however, indicate that a worker's express or imto forego coverage as an independent contractor was
plied agreement
3 59
"significant.
It added that where there were compelling indicia of
the protections derived
employment present, an individual waiver of
36 0 There was no evidence
from employment would not be assumed.
of any meaningful bargaining as to the terms of the agreement or as
to any "voluntary" election of an independent and unprotected status361 in the Borello case. It appears reasonable to speculate that in
situations where an equality of bargaining does exist and a more free
waiver of rights is undertaken, a different result may inure.
Because of the relatively low wage of most agricultural workers
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

CAL LABOR CODE §§3351, 3353 (West 1982).
48 Cal. 3d at - 769 D.2d at 409, 269 Cal.
Id.
.- , 769 P.2d at 407, 269 Cal.
48 Cal. 3d at
48 Cal. 3d at - 769 P.2d at 409, 269 Cal.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
48 Cal. 3d at _ 769 P.2d at 410, 269 Cal.

Rptr. at
Rptr. at
Rptr. at

Rptr. at
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and the lack of identifiable training or skills required, any review of
this type of worker will be inherently suspect, and the likelihood of
finding economic dependence is extremely high. Courts have found
an employment relationship to exist even in circumstances where the
putative employees could hire and control their own helpers. 3"2 Even
where the contractor is found to have employees, the farmer may be
determined to be a "joint employer" if reasonable steps have not
been taken to ensure that the contractor has complied with all required employment filings. 63
The retroactive charges and record keeping requirements imposed by the FLSA 6 4 and the fact that the nonpayment of employment taxes is not dischargeable in bankruptcy 36 5 make the employment status of laborers a serious area of concern for all farmers who
retain workers from time-to-time to assist them in the farming operation. The fact that devastating economic hardship on the farm
could result, however, was considered in United States Department
of Labor v. Lauritzen but did not alter the finding of an employment
status.36 6 In an effort to provide some certainty and control, Wisconsin enacted a statute which restricted efforts to remove farm workers
from state labor standards by making them independent
67
contractors.1
C.

Service Sector

Today, the service sector employs three out of four American
workers.36 8 The rise of the service sector has altered, and will continue to alter, the dynamics of the workplace, affecting everything
from wages and the length of the work week to the size of the typical
business establishment. The average manufacturing enterprise employs approximately sixty people, compared with only eleven for the
typical service establishment.36 9 Between 1978 and 1982, more than
half of all new jobs were created by firms with fewer than one hundred employees.3 70 The smallest firms, those with fewer than twenty
employees, now employ one out of every five workers but are creat362. See supra note 159 and accompanying text; Mednick v. Albert Enters., 508 F.2d
301 (5th Cir. 1975).
363. Howard v. Malcom, 852 F.2d 101 (4th Cir. 1988).
364. 603 F.2d at 748.

365.

See United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268 (1978).

366.
367.
368.
369.
370.

835 F.2d at 1535.
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§103.90-97 (West 1987).
See Riddle, supra note 35 and accompanying text.

Id.
See BERLIN & SUM, supra note 43 and accompanying text.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol8/iss2/3

36

Bruntz: The Employee/Independent Contractor Dichotomy: A Rose is Not Alwa
Employee/Contractor Dichotomy

1991]

ing two-fifths of all new jobs."'
By their very nature, service industries must be located when
and where consumers need them, and their hours of operation must
7 2 Employbe flexible enough to accommodate consumer schedules.
ers have turned to part-time workers and independent contractors as
a way to adapt their services to consumers' patterns, and they are
expected to continue to do so.23 The issue of whether a provider of
services is considered an employee or an independent contractor
often arises in a service context when an injury arises in the furtherance of the services. It can also arise when the relationship is severed
37 4
and the service provider seeks unemployment insurance. These situations create severe hardship in some cases because the parties engaging the providers of services have no expectancy that they will be
37
responsible for employment-related charges.
The fundamental distinction which controls the discussion appears to be whether the provider of services is, in fact, engaged in an
independent trade or business.3 6 This distinction does not mean that
one must examine only whether the endeavor is the type that would
customarily be considered an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business.37 7 Instead one must look at whether
the facts dictate that an independent concern was in fact formed and
engaged. The case of McGuire v. Department of Employment Security3781 highlights the importance of this distinction. McGuire was
a quadriplegic who contracted with licensed practical nurses to provide constant care.37 9 The nurses, who had to be licensed, were paid
a set hourly wage and entered into agreements which acknowledged
3 80 The Utah Industrial
that they were independent contractors.
Commission determined that these nurses were not exempt from unemployment coverage '8 and the Court of Appeals confirmed the decision and determined that even though a worker might possess a
business or professional license which would allow an independent
trade, it is necessary that such a person have engaged in "such an
371. W. JOHNSON WORKFORCE 2000; WORK AND WORKERS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY at XIX, XVII, XX, 59 (1987).
372.
373.
374.

Id.
Id.
Id.

375.

SMALL BUSINESS REPORTS,

376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.

840 F.2d at 1059.
Id.
768 P.2d 985 (Utah App. 1989).
Id. at 986.
Id.
Id. at 988.

April 1990, at 32-35.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1991

37

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 3
Hofstra Labor Law Journal[

[Vol. 8:2

independent business, occupation or profession, not whether he or
she could have [been engaged in an independent business.]" 882 This
same result occurred in other diverse fields such as jockeys 8 3 and
television writers, 3 84 both of which clearly are specialized occupational areas.
The service sector considered for this discussion is confined to
situations such as McGuire where an individual or business seeks to
obtain services and inadvertently enters into an employment relation8 5 a furniture
ship. In Evans v. Naihaus3
salesman who had several
rental properties was found responsible for worker's compensation
claims by an individual who he periodically retained to perform periodic maintenance and repair services on his rental property.3 88 However in Sandy v. Salter 87 the Arkansas Supreme Court found that a
carpenter who sustained injuries in remodeling a house could not collect worker's compensation against the owners of the house.3 8 8 In

both cases the defendants had no personal skill or knowledge in construction or repair and did not supervise or direct any work performed by the respective claimants. 89 Each claimant used his own
tools and each received an hourly compensation. 8 While factual
distinctions between the two cases, are hard to draw it appears significant that the defendant in Evans v. Naihaus was found to be in the
business of managing rental property. 391 The court provided that,
"the nature of the claimant's work in relation to the regular business
of the employer has taken precedence over other relevant factors. 3'" 9 2

Another significant factor courts have considered in finding an
employment relationship is the level of inherent risk or danger associated with the under taking. As early as the 1920's courts have held
that if the work being done by the contractor is of an inherently
dangerous character, then regardless .of.how independent the contractor may be, immunity will be denied to the employer.

98

The

382. Isenberg v. California Employment 'Stalibization Comm'n., 180 P. 2d 11 (Cal.
1947).
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
is further
393.

Tieberg v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 471 P. 2d 947 (Cal. 1970).
326 So. 2d 601.
Id. at 604.
541 S.W.2d 929.
Id. at 931.
Id.; Evans, 326 So.2d at 603.
Sandy, 541 S.W.2d 929, 930; Evans, 326 So.2d at 603.
326 So.2d at 603.
Id.
For discussion, see Blount v. Tow Fong, 48 R.I. 453, 138 A. 52 (1937). The subject
annotated in 23 A.L.R. 984 (1913), and 21 A.L.R. 1229, 1243, 1265 (1922).
Grothe, 659 P. 2d 602.
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Alaska Supreme Court said that because the inherent danger of
working with dynamite made it unreasonable for a licensed professional to be self-insured, it weighed in favor of considering the person an employee. 394 This is an area of particular concern because
some state worker's compensation statutes prevent employers in certain occupations of a hazardous nature from engaging independent
contractors without liability when otherwise they would be liable to
39 5
pay compensation if their own employees performed the work.
Unless parties are engaged with distinct business or professional
organizations that invoice for services rendered and service a broad
clientele, significant risk is involved in engaging independent contractors to perform services. This risk is compounded if the services
to be performed are in furtherance of a regular business or if they
are of a dangerous nature.

V.

GUIDANCE

Taxwise, the safest way to retain a provider of services is to
consider the person an employee, though this is also clearly the most
expensive. 96 A business may compromise its ability to be competitive in its industry by adding to the cost of its product or service the
costs associated with additional employees.
The best time to settle the uncertainty of worker classification is
before the relationship commences. Courts have been very consistent
in finding an employment relationship to exist where an employer
has sought to change the nature of the relationship with the same
parties involved.3 97 The employer or the worker may request a determination letter from the Internal Revenue Service District Director's
Office by submitting Form SS-8.38 The instructions require an employer to complete the form for one worker who is representative of
3 99 This is also the
the class of workers whose status is in question.
time to define the level of control to be exercised over the project or
task. If the directions extend beyond explaining the result to be ob394. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 95 N.E. 2d 482 (Ill. 1950).
395.

Employee benefits cost approximately 40% of straight wage costs. R. HENDERSON,

COMPENSATION MANAGEMENT: REWARDING PERFORMANCE 334 (3D ED. 1982).
396. See JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 2.

397. Form SS-8 Rev. Oct. 1990, OMB No. 1545-0004.
398. Id.
399. See, e.g., Merchants Home Delivery Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 580 F.2d 966, 974
(9th Cir. 1978) (providing that "there is a difference between directing the means and manner
of performance of work and exercising an ex post facto right to reprimand when the end result
is unsatisfactory."). Id.
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tained, a designation of employee status will likely follow. 400 It is
helpful in reaching independent status if the method of compensation
is also predicated on reaching the defined result.401
A finding of independent contractor may be enhanced by the
existence of a written agreement which details the worker's duties
and the terms and conditions of the service arrangement.4 °2 The document should incorporate the common law factors and recite the
parties' intent to create an independent contractor relationship. IRS
regulations require that a written contract must be in place to cover
real estate agents and door to door sales people, and that the contracts must contain language that the agent is responsible for payroll, income and other taxes.4 03 This consideration should be extended to every contract covering independent contractors regardless
of the type of service being provided. The agreement should also
identify the services to be performed, the payment of expenses and
the requirement that a business license be obtained by the independent contractors. An agreement will never supersede the objective
facts of the relationship, however, and there is substantial authority
that the existence of an agreement will not be considered. 40 4
It is also well advised to engage contractors who are incorporated,40 5 who have their own capital equipment and business premises, and who have other similarly situated customers. While none of
these factors individually will be controlling, they are all very persuasive in tipping the balance toward an independent contractor status. 408 The prevailing guideline is that to be safe the provider of services must be engaged as a separate company, performing distinct
tasks not central to the nature of the primary business, and for
400. But see United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 36 (1945). The method of payment
is legally irrelevant to a finding of control, or to any other finding relating to employee status.
Id.
401.

See generally 56 (C.J.S. Master and Servant §3 et. seq. (1948 and Supp. 1990).

402. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
403. See McComb, 331 U.S. at 729. Economic realities, not contractual labels, determine employment status for the remedial purpose of the FLSA. Usery, 527 F.2d 1308, 1315.
Recitations in contract are not important for tax liability. Silk, 331 U.S. 708. It is not significant how one could have acted under the contract terms, because the controlling realities are
reflected by the way one actually acts. Usery, 527 F.2d 1308. These courts implicitly rejected
or minimized the RBSTATEMENT factor of "intent of the parties."
404. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. But see I.R.C. §530(d). The incorporation or partner status of a technical specialist will not remove the Section 1706/Section 530(d)
finding of employee.
405. The United States Supreme Court emphasized that in determining whether a
worker is an employee, the circumstances of the whole activity should be examined rather than
any one particular factor. McComb, 331 U.S. at 730.
406.

Id.
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which the allocation of employees would be a virtual impossibility.
An employer is particularly vulnerable to a finding of employment status if the workers are lower paid, lower skilled individuals.
Courts have extended broad latitude to bring this class of individuals
under the protection of the respective statute being reviewed.4 7 The
relative lack of bargaining power and the high degree of dependence
of the workers compels a finding of employment status. While economic reality may not be the test being applied, it is always the underlying theme.
If the provider of services is on more equal footing with the pu408 should
tative employer, the RESTATEMENT principles of agency
govern the consideration. Employer control can be quite substantial
under this analysis if other factors point toward an independent
relationship.4 °9
CONCLUSION

Independent contractors and employees perform identical services for employers, but they may be identified differently depending
upon the decision of the employer, the application of certain statutes,
or by judicial interpretation." 0 The ultimate classification has grave
411 The risk of
implications for both the worker and the employer.
retroactive reclassification and the resulting imposition of penalties
are concerns which may confront anyone who engages another to
mow a lawn or clean a carpet, as well as large commercial businesses
or agricultural concerns.412
The classification of employment status is not immutable and
the ultimate determination is a finding of law41 3 subject to de novo
consideration by appellate courts. An understanding of the range of
interpretation and the methods used in making classification decisions will serve as a guide to developing a strategy for considering
workers, employees, or independent contractors. In light of the IRS'
aggressive pursuit of employment taxes from employers with nominal independent contractors, and pervasive new legislation imposing
41 4
new restrictions on the employment relationship, how a class of
407.

See supra note 23.

408. See supra notes 251-274 and accompanying text.
409.

See supra notes 60-386 and accompanying text.

410.

Id.

411.

See generally 56 C.J.S. Master and Servant §3 et. seq. (1948 and Supp. 1990).

412. Beliz, 765 F.2d at 1327.
413. See supra notes 60-386 and accompanying text.
414. The Americans with Disabilities Act has been termed the most sweeping civil
rights legislation passed in Congress in twenty-five years. Ray and Brown, "Federal Legislative
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workers is characterized is a fundamental decision from which serious consequences may flow.
Facile labels and subjective factors are only relevant to the extent they mirror the economic control and reality of the situation.
One must look to the essence of the relationship and determine what
level of control and dependence is necessary to achieve the desired
result.4 15 Once the control level is assessed, the tests and considerations outlined herein should be cautiously applied in a detailed, fact
specific, individualized inquiry. 16

Update," 6 THE LABoR LAWYER 1029, 1032 (1990).
415. Id.
416. See supra notes 399-409 and accompanying text.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol8/iss2/3

42

